This article offers two theoretical contributions. First, we develop the concept of administrative burden as an important variable in understanding how citizens experience the state. Administrative burden is conceptualized as a function of learning, psychological, and compliance costs that citizens experience in their interactions with government. Second, we argue that administrative burden is a venue of politics, i.e., the level of administrative burden placed on an individual, as well as the distribution of burden between the state and the individual, will often be a function of deliberate political choice rather than simply a product of historical accident or neglect. The opaque nature of administrative burdens may facilitate their use as forms of "hidden politics", where significant policy changes occur without broad political consideration. We illustrate this argument via an analysis of the evolution of Medicaid policies in the state of Wisconsin. Across three Governorships, the level of burden evolved in ways consistent with the differing political philosophies of each Governor, with federal actors playing a secondary but important role in shaping burden in this intergovernmental program. We conclude by sketching a research agenda centered on administrative burden.
Introduction
Our experience of government is shaped through the burdens we encounter in our interactions with the state. These burdens are an important yet understudied part of governance, since they affect whether citizens succeed in accessing services (did I get what I want?), whether public policies succeed (did a program reach the targeted group?), and the perceptions of government (was I treated fairly and with respect?) Aspects of administrative burden are explored in different streams of research, such as studies of red tape, political sociology, street level bureaucracy, policy feedback, and program take-up. But across prior work there is not a broad or common conceptualization of administrative burden. In the first section of this article, we articulate administrative burden as composed of learning costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs that citizens face in their interactions with government. Accounting for administrative burden alters the unit of analysis in citizen-state interactions, emphasizing those factors that make the experience of the citizen more or less onerous. For some interactions burdens may be low, and for some they may be high, and in many cases burdens are in place to serve legitimate public values. Understanding why such burdens occur, and how they shape the experience of the state should be central questions in the study of public administration.
In addition to conceptualizing administrative burden, a second goal of the article is to examine relationship between burden and politics. We argue that the creation and reduction of burden, as well as the distribution of burden between the state and the individual, is a venue where politics plays out. The preferences of political actors about a policy will in turn shape what they perceive as the appropriate level of burden in that policy area -for example, proponents of welfare programs are more apt to seek to reduce burdens and increase access, while opponents will favor heavier burdens. We support this claim using a case-study of the evolution of burden in one policy area (Medicaid) in the state of Wisconsin. The case also illustrates a second claim, which is that administrative burdens form an important part of the "hidden politics" that characterize battles about the role of the state (Hacker 2004 , Thompson 2013 ). Policymakers will alter burdens as an alternative or complement to more overt forms of political activity. The attractiveness of administrative burdens as a form a "policymaking by other means" (Lineberry 1977 ) is tied to their opacity. The details of administration that give rise to burden may be largely invisible to the public and even most policymakers, their impact poorly understood. Changes to burdens may be presented as technical fixes without any specific policy intent, or to serve values widely supported or perceived as apolitical (Edelman 1985) .
We conclude the article by considering the research questions raised by the presence of administrative burden in citizen-state interactions. Such interactions communicate lessons to citizens, signaling their standing and expectations about their political engagement (Soss 1999) .
Such lessons, in turn, impact the political participation of citizens (Bruch, Marx-Freere and Soss 2010) . Administrative burdens therefore mediate how citizens experience the state as a positive or negative force, frame how they understand their relationship with it, and influence how citizens engage in civic actions. Burdens are consequential in other ways. They matter to whether citizens access services to which they are entitled and desire. If policies fail to reach their intended targets because of burdens, this undermines their potential to achieve their goals.
Burdens also matter to normative and empirical discussions of how the state mediates equity, since some groups of citizens may be more or less targeted by burdens, or more or less able to manage burdens. These divisions are especially important in the context of race, class, and gender differences.
Conceptualizing Administrative Burden
The term "administrative burden" may evoke images of business regulation, or basic bureaucratic encounters such as renewing ones driving license. But any context in which the state regulates private behavior or structures how individuals seek public services is a venue to study the burdens imposed in that process. For example, in the area of immigration, US citizenship applications require complex paperwork, demanding documentation, application fees, English proficiency, and knowledge of US history. Approximately half of individuals eligible for US naturalization do not apply (Fix, Passel and Sucher 2003) , and surveys suggest that administrative burdens are partly responsible (Gonzalez-Barrera, Lopez, Passel, and Taylor
2013).
Education is another policy area where burdens matter. Take the example of college attendance. High-achieving low-income students face learning costs that their better-advised high-income peers do not. Lacking knowledge on likely financial aid benefits, or their eligibility for application-fee waivers, low-income students are less likely to apply to selective institutions that would actually cost them less (Hoxby and Avery 2012) . Experiments show that overcoming these learning costs has a large effect on whether students apply for and eventually attend college. The provision of help in completing applications among those applying for federal financial aid for post-secondary schooling resulted in dramatic increases in applications and a 29 percent increase in actual college enrollment (Bettinger et al. 2009 ). Another experiment provided students information packets that included a summary of appropriate schools given their academic achievement, the net costs of different colleges for students at different income levels, and a voucher for free college applications. Low-income students receiving this treatment were 46 percent more likely to attend a selective institution than a control group (Hoxby and Turner 2012) .
The ability of citizens to exercise democratic rights by voting is another area where burdens matter. Historically, burdens such as literacy tests, applied on racial lines, have been used to deliberately limit access to ballots (Keyssar 2001) . While the contemporary version of this debate focuses on voter identification requirements (Hale and McNeal 2010) , the lesscontentious burdens imposed by voter registration processes also matter. Relative to states where voters must register weeks before the election, states that allow voters to register on election day have higher turnout rates of between 3-7 percent (Burden et al. 2013 ).
Common to these examples are individuals seeking access to basic public services central to their identity and capacities as citizens, and encountering different types of costs that are not just a nuisance, but have a material effect on citizens and policy goals. To systematically identify and understand the effect of such burdens in different areas of policy implementation, we need to be able to define them, a task we turn to next.
Defining Administrative Burden
Administrative burden has been previously defined as an individual's experience of policy implementation as onerous (Burden et al. 2012) . This simple definition signals that burdens are distinct from rules, pointing instead to the costs that individuals experience in their interactions with the state. Here, building on prior work (e.g., Currie 2006; Hernanz, Malherbet and Pellizzari 2004; Orbach 2006; Remler et al 2001.) , we briefly identify broad categories of costs that constitute administrative burden (see Table 1 ), offering more detailed examples of these costs in the context of social programs below.
Learning costs arise from engaging in search processes to collect information about public services, and assessing how they are relevant to the individual. Psychological costs include the stigma of applying for or participating in a program with negative perceptions, a sense of loss of power or autonomy in interactions with the state, or the stresses of dealing with administrative processes. Compliance costs are the burdens of following administrative rules and requirements. For example, for those applying to a program for services, these are the costs of completing forms, or providing documentation of status. For individuals or businesses being regulated by government, these are the costs of complying with regulation.
Cognitive and Social Psychological Aspects of Burden
Our framing of administrative burden as costs may infer a rational approach where citizens weigh costs against expected benefits. But research from behavioral economics warns us that decisions rarely follow this model (for an overview see Baicker, Congdon, and Mullainathan 2012, and Shafir, 2013) . The impact of burdens depends upon on how individuals construe the world, not on objective measures of costs and benefits. This construal is shaped by contextual factors that frame burdens and interact with individual psychological processes, including cognitive biases that may generate disproportionate response to burden. This basic insight explains why burdens that seem minor and defensible when designed by the administrator may exert dramatic effects when experienced by citizens.
Behavioral economics also helps to identify particular cognitive biases that make burdens more consequential (Shafir 2013) . Individuals have biases in perceiving risk and probability, which in turn alter their willingness to overcome administrative burdens. For example, someone who thinks they will not become sick will be less likely to make the effort to overcome the 8 burdens involved in enrolling in health insurance. Individuals also tend to overvalue the status quo of their situation, even if a different state is objectively superior. This implies that how institutions structure the default choice individuals face will have significant effects. For example, changing the default on private savings plan from non-participation to participation has a large effect on take-up rates (Choi et al. 2004) . Individuals have biases in temporal planning, favoring the present and discounting the future. Avoiding burdens in the present may therefore be preferred even at the expense of significant long-term net benefits. Another bias arises from choice overload or decisional conflict, which occurs when individuals feel overwhelmed by a multiplicity of choice, resulting in indecision, the selection of defaults, or poor decisions. This suggests the virtue of presenting citizens with simple and limited choices.
Work from social psychology points to other micro-foundational aspects of behavior relevant to understanding burden. Individuals have a basic need for autonomy over their self and actions (Deci and Ryan 1985) . In processes where the state imposes burdens, it acts as a source of extrinsic direction. The more forceful that direction and the more at odds with the individual's intrinsic preferences, the greater the sense of loss of autonomy, which in turn will lower willingness to participate in and satisfaction with the process. Social psychology also points to the importance of procedural justice (Lind and Tyler 1988) . Individuals care as much or more about the process of their interactions with the state as they do about the outcome. This implies that procedures perceived as consistent, fair, and equitable are fundamentally important to citizens.
If behavioral economics elucidates why small burdens can be a big deal, social psychology suggests that violating basic psychological needs of autonomy and respectful treatment exacerbates burdens. These insights align well with observational research in policy feedback studies, which shows how citizens value processes seen as respectful and empowering, but respond negatively to processes that are seen as unfair and demeaning (Soss 1999; Bruch, Marx-Freere and Soss 2011) . Cross-national comparisons of citizen trust in government find that fair and equitable processes matter more than assessments of government performance (Van Ryzin 2012).
Administrative Burden in Social Policies
The study of administrative burden is relatively rare in the field of public administration, even in literatures centered on citizens-state interactions (e.g., citizen participation, coproduction, or customer-service). In red tape research, an obvious corollary, the primary focus has been on how rules affect the experience of administrative employees (Bozeman and Feeney 2011; Moynihan and Herd 2010) .
1 Attention to the ways in which rules or administrative discretion reduces access to programs is most prominent at the intersection of public administration and social policy (e.g., Brodkin and Majmundar 2010; Fossett and Thompson 2006) , reflecting a broader concern with issues of "bureaucratic disentitlement" (Lipsky 1984) and how this relates to matter of equity (Piven and Cloward 1971) . This section reviews social 1 While much of what we discuss as administrative burden might be understood colloquially as red tape, it is important to respect the careful and valuable conceptual development in red tape research that has taken place in the last 20 years, and we seek here to distinguish these related concepts. As noted above, the first main distinction is the population studied, with red tape traditionally focusing on employees, not citizens. A second and more important conceptual distinction is that dominant definition of red tape excludes rules that exert a compliance burden but still have a legitimate purpose (Bozeman, 2000, 12) . In considering the definition of red tape, Bozeman and Feeney (2011, 48) note that: "Red tape is bad. It is not an aid to accountability or legitimacy or a means of ensuring participation. Rules that appropriately hold organizations accountable may not be popular with the people constrained by them, but they are not red tape." By contrast, we assume that administrative burdens will often serve legitimate purposes and are not inherently bad. A third important distinction with red tape research is that while it focuses on the compliance burden generated by rules, we argue that this is just one component of a broader experience of burden, falling into the category of compliance costs. (ASPE 2007, II-19) . The central difference between these programs is that means-tested programs must do more to distinguish between the eligible and ineligible, and in creating administrative processes to do so, they impose higher levels of burdens. Table 1 identifies how the basic categories of burdens defined above apply in social policies. 
Learning Costs
The effects of learning costs on take-up in social policy have been inferred in various ways. One approach is to document lack of knowledge about a program by its target population.
Individuals are frequently unaware of a program, whether they qualify, what is required to do so, and the size of the benefits at stake. Individual knowledge varies across programs, but even for relatively prominent and valuable programs such as the EITC, surveys have found that 43 percent of those eligible were unaware of the program, 33 percent believed incorrectly they were ineligible, and that respondents significantly underestimated benefits (Bhargava and Dayanand Manoli 2011) . About half of eligible non-participants for job training programs (Heckman and Smith 2003) and SNAP (Bartlett, Burnstein and Hamilton 2004 ) believe they are not eligible.
Surveys of non-participants suggest indicate that they would apply for programs if they knew for certain they were eligible (Bartlett, Burnstein and Hamilton 2004) .
Learning costs have also been evoked to explain the negative effects of other variables on take-up, such as living further from administrative centers (Warlick 1982) , having lower education, or language barriers (Heckman and Smith 2003) . Learning costs also help to explain why those already in one program become more likely to access other services (Zedlewski et al. 1993; Currie and Gruber 1996) , since applying to one program can generate knowledge about others. Association with groups such as unions, or aid from private actors such as tax preparers, has been shown to increase take-up (Budd and McCall 1997; Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007) , as these third parties reduce learning costs by directly providing relevant information.
Some research has directly measured the effect of providing additional information. The IRS sends reminders about the EITC to those who appear to be are eligible, which has been shown to generate a 41 percent jump in take-up among initial non-claimants (Bhargava and Dayanand Manoli 2011) . One field experiment found that additional reminders increased eligible claims even further. The same experiment also showed that simpler reminders and providing basic benefit information generated a greater return than more complex reminders, or reminders that lacked benefit information (Bhargava and Dayanand Manoli 2011) . Another field experiment found that informing individuals about their eligibility for SNAP raised participation rates (Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor 1999) .
Psychological Costs
Different streams of research point to the way in which psychological costs can emerge in the provision of social benefits. Economists have pointed to the stigma of participating in unpopular programs (Moffitt 1983) . Research from political science and political sociology provides a logic for why programs serving the poor are unpopular, with recipients characterized as 'undeserving' (Katz 1986; Horan and Austin 1974; Piven and Cloward 1971) . This is in stark contrast to programs of a more universal nature, such as Social Security, where the broader based of beneficiaries are perceived of as 'deserving' (Mettler 2011) .
Individuals may opt out of participating in unpopular programs to avoiding damaging their self-identity, or the negative treatments they believe are associated with participation (Stuber and Schlesinger 2006) . For example, the stigma of using foodstamps (as opposed to discount coupons) at a grocery store is a consequence of political perceptions of the program. In a survey of likely-eligible individuals not receiving food stamp benefits 27 percent said they would not apply (Bartlett, Burnstein and Hamilton 2004) . Why not? Many preferred to not be dependent upon what were seen as government handouts. Many also reported a desire for others not to observe them shopping with food stamps, know they had financial needs, or a desire to avoid going to the welfare office.
If an individual chooses to participate in a program, administrative practices can reinforce the effect of stigma. In particular, interactions with the state may be experiences of power, or more precisely, the loss of personal autonomy. As the interaction is experienced as degrading, intrusive, and directive, it erodes the basic need for autonomy. Processes to receive benefits may require evidence of oneself or one's behavior before the state that is normally reserved for citizens under suspicion of law-breaking, and may communicate that the claimant is being judged in moral terms. Historically, benefits to single mothers have often been conditioned on caseworkers judgment that claimants were providing suitable homes, which could be examined via unannounced "midnight raids" (Piven and Cloward 1971) . Echoes of such extreme examples remain in parts of the contemporary welfare system. For example, fingerprinting applicants lowers food stamp application completion (Bartlett, Burstein, and Hamilton 2004) , and some US states have attempted to require urine testing for drugs as a requirement for the receipt of benefits. The questions claimants face may force them to provide what they see as private and unnecessary information, such as sexual behavior or the income of co-habitants (Brodkin 1992; Soss 1999) . A sense of subservience and loss of autonomy is furthered when claimants feel they must artificially alter their identify to be successful, contorting themselves into what they perceive as the caseworker's image of the appropriate client (Lipsky 1980; Soss 1999) , or participate in requirements whose purpose they disagree with. For example, participants may view job-training programs as offering few skills enabling them to move out of poverty, but feel little choice but to participate (Dias and Maynard Moody 2007) .
Other aspects of citizen-state interactions may more subtly reinforce messages of power and standing. For example, Goodsell (1977) notes that government waiting spaces tend to be systematically designed to communicate symbols to those who use them. Even, the simple act of waiting communicates that the state believes that individuals' time is of little value (Lipsky 1980) . Such spaces may also be characterized by few amenities, the use of security, and partitions between claimants and caseworkers, further communicating the limited standing of the claimant (Soss 1999 ).
Studies of welfare programs illustrate how the state may communicate that the individual lacks the capacity to determine how to live their lives, and must conform to externally imposed processes and directives. Qualitative accounts find welfare claimants acutely aware of the disempowering effects of such processes, and their relative lack of autonomy in the interaction, resulting in a sense frustration, powerlessness and degradation (Dias and Maynard Moody 2007; Lipsky 1980; Soss 1999) . One largely unexamined aspect of psychological costs is the stresses they impose on claimants. In situations where the individual depends upon the state for vital resources -e.g., the provision of health services, income, immigration status -uncertainty about the receipt of those benefits, as well as frustrations in the process of seeking may elevate stresses among individuals. While there is extensive evidence that caregiving of the old, sick, and disabled is associated with higher stress and consequent poor health (Pinquart and Sorensen 2003) , there has been little effort to examine to what degree that stress is a consequence of negative interactions with the state while attempting to obtain benefits.
Understanding the imposition of psychological costs by the state on its citizens is inherently important, and policy feedback research suggests that these costs might lower civic participation (Bruch, Marx-Freere and Soss 2011) . However, the evidence of how psychological costs matter to program take-up is less strong than for other types of burdens. The expanded use of electronic benefit cards to replace actual food stamps should reduce stigma costs, but there is mixed evidence on whether such cards have increased take-up (Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold 2008; Schanzenbach 2009) . A field experiment to reduce stigma with the EITC (by sending mailings to eligible respondents that emphasize higher peer use, or framing benefits as a reward for hard work) did not increase take-up (Bhargava and Dayanand Manoli 2011) , and there is not strong evidence that advertising campaigns that frame programs in positive terms matter to take-up (Kincheloe, Frates and Brown 2006; Ratcliffe, McKernan and Finegold 2008) .
These results may indicate that opinions about programs are difficult to change. It is also worth noting that we largely lack experimental evidence on negative treatments likely to induce psychological costs, e.g., drug testing claimants. Additionally, while psychological and compliance burdens are conceptually distinct, it is often difficult to practically separate them in the type of empirical studies described here. Some of the benefits associated with reductions in compliance burdens discussed next may be attributable to reductions in psychological costs.
Compliance Costs
Of the three different aspects of burden identified in Table 1 , there is the strongest empirical evidence on the effects of compliance costs. 2 Surveys of nonparticipants in SNAP (Bartlett, Burstein and Hamilton 2004) found that 40 percent emphasized the paperwork involved in applying, while another 37 percent pointed to the difficulty in taking the time to apply given work or familial responsibilities. Among those who actually applied but then dropped out, one quarter indicated that this was because of the burdens in the application process.
Natural experiments have shown that new income documentation requirements reduce program participation among eligible participants (Brien and Swann 1999) . Requiring applicants to undertake face-to-face interviews with case-workers also decreases participation (Wolfe and Scrivner 2005) .
Participation in TANF sharply declined relative to its predecessor AFDC, which may partly have been the result of the more stringent conditions of participation. Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) find that procedural barriers explain a significant amount of the decline in welfare caseloads. Ewalt and Jennings (2004) find that an index that captures the restrictiveness of state policies (including barriers such as documenting workforce participation requirements) and a measure of the organizational culture of case-workers are also associated with greater caseload reductions. The latter finding reflects the potential for bureaucratic discretion to be used to burden applicants (Brodkin 2011 ). An example of the use of such discretion comes from Soss, Fording and Schram's (2011, 210-11) study of contractor-run job-training programs. One company determined that it was not reaching its job placement targets because some participants were not sufficiently motivated, and instituted a requirement that participants would have to attend 40 hours of training classes (with no absences) before benefits could be received.
There is also evidence that efforts to reduce compliance costs increase take-up. States that simplified reporting procedures and required less frequent recertification in SNAP saw an increase in successful claimants (Hanratty 2006; Kabbani and Wilde 2003; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold 2008) . The use of a single form for multiple programs is associated with increased take-up in Medicaid (Leininger et al. 2011) . Similarly, having easy access to application material increases take-up. The availability of electronic applications increased EITC and SNAP take-up (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007; Schwabisch 2012) . The provision of help in completing applications also matters. Access to community-based application assistants increased of certain groups in Medicaid enrollment (Aizer 2003) , and providing application help has been shown to lead to an almost 80 percent increase in SNAP applications relative to those who were informed they were eligible but given no special assistance (Schanzenbach, 2009) . The most dramatic way by which the state can reduce application compliance burden is to auto-enroll eligible individuals into a program based on administrative data, which has also increased take-up of health insurance programs Dorn, Hill and Hogan 2009 ).
Burden as a Policy Instrument
Some research at the intersection of politics, inequality and social policy has previously argued that burdens are imposed deliberately to limit claims on the public purse, and targeted at groups with little political power (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1971; Brodkin and Lipsky 1983; Brodkin 2011; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011) . Even so, the link between politics and administratively-imposed burdens has not been widely explored in public administration. For example, when the origins of red tape are considered, benign neglect and historical accident are more prominent explanations than deliberate political choice (Moynihan and Herd 2010) .
Here, we offer two propositions about the relationship between politics and administrative burdens. The first and most basic claim is that administrative burden is a venue where politics plays out. The policy preferences of political actors-most prominently elected officials, but also stakeholders, political appointees, managers, and street-level bureaucrats -will affect their attitudes about the nature of burden in that policy area: whether it should be created or reduced, and the relative balance of burden between the individual and the state. This claim aligns with theoretical traditions that emphasize the willingness of political actors to design administrative structures to serve political ends, even if the outcomes are operationally dysfunctional (Moe 1989) .
Second, we propose that certain qualities of administrative burden make it attractive to pursue as a form of "policymaking by other means" (Lineberry 1977 ) -an alternative or complement to more overt forms of policymaking. Hacker (2004) has argued that retrenchment of the welfare state has occurred via "hidden politics", not just via large-scale formal changes.
While Hacker is most concerned about the failure of the welfare state to evolve to reflect the contemporary shift of risks to the individual, administrative burden fits into the category of "subterranean political processes that shape ground-level policy effects" (Hacker, 2004, 243) Table 2 summarizes the key changes occuring during each governorship that relate to the three aspects of administrative burden. This summary helps to illustrate the benefits of our conceptualization of administrative burden. In contrast to a study that might have focused on legislated policy changes, policy implementation from the perspective of administrators, or street-level worker discretion, the unit of analysis here is centered on administrative factors that will alter the experience of individual applicant. The development of the concept of administrative burden into specific types of costs also improves our theoretical understanding of how these administrative changes relate to burden. applications, online application systems, and application assistance. These changes were significant, and meaningfully increased enrollment (see Herd et al. 2013; Leninger et al. 2011 ), but largely occurred via unobtrusive changes in administrative processes with little broad political discussion. In short, they were forms of hidden politics.
Governor Thompson: Making Work Pay
Governor Thompson (1987 Thompson ( -2001 was a leader in the movement to tie welfare benefits to work, having passed a version of welfare reform prior to national reform. Welfare reform was a defining political issue for Thompson, a Republican, and his motivation for changes in public health insurance was inextricably tied to a policy goal of "making work pay." Thompson saw health insurance as a means of encouraging individuals to move from welfare, and a basic matter of fairness, arguing that that those on public assistance should not enjoy better health insurance than the working poor. families. DHS operations memos to staff instructed that all direct marketing materials were to be "written in prose that is easily understandable" and at no higher than a sixth grade reading level.
DHS also targeted outreach to non-English speakers. Health care providers, public health departments, community organizations, and school systems received 850,000 brochures in English, Spanish, and Hmong, and the state offered translators who could provide program information. A toll-free hotline was set up to aid potential applicants.
To begin an application, clients had to sign and date the form in the presence of an eligibility worker. To reduce this compliance burden, workers were located at county, tribal, social, and human services departments; state agencies; local community centers, health clinics, and schools; and various outstation sites such as federally qualified health-centers. Outstationed eligibility workers had laptop computers with dial-up capacity to link them to state databases.
Allowing participants to sign up at outstationing sites rather than welfare offices was also meant to decrease psychological costs by making BadgerCare look more like private insurance and less like welfare.
A change in state law in 2000 reinforced the notion that the role of eligibility workers was to help the client to complete the form. If applicants were not able to obtain the required verification on their own, the law stated that "the agency may not deny assistance but shall proceed immediately to verify the data elements." In an operations memo, eligibility workers were instructed to "only verify those items required to determine eligibility and benefits," not to over-verify by "requiring excessive pieces of evidence for any one item," or "exclusively require BadgerCare, but not participating in the program, found that even among those who had never had any member of their family enrolled in the program, 80 percent had heard of the BadgerCare program (Gavin et al. 2003) . By putting multiple state medical assistance programs and funding sources under the umbrella of a single program with one name, the state was able to streamline the marketing message and make it easier for individuals to understand if they were eligible. The efforts to increase access appear to have been successful. Between its implementation in 1999 and 2008, prior to the implementation of BadgerCare Plus (discussed next), enrollment in the program more than doubled from approximately 215,000 to 510,000.
Governor Doyle: All Kids
In the early years of Governor Jim Doyle's (2003 Doyle's ( -2010 administration, BadgerCare was not perceived as a top priority. Indeed, Doyle, a Democrat, supported the introduction of additional constraints in response to legislative worries that the provision of public health insurance would discourage low-income workers from using available employer-based insurance. To avoid this "crowd-out" problem, the state required workers to take forms to their employers to verify that affordable insurance was not available. The state estimated that the new verification requirement would reduce enrollment by two to three percent. But the DHS saw enrollment drop by 20 percent for children and 17.6 percent for parents within a year. Officials in the Doyle administration pointed to this experience as an important lesson about how seemingly marginal changes in burden generate dramatic changes in take-up. Employees at DHS concluded that because so few low-income applicants actually had access to affordable employer-sponsored health insurance, the verification form was not an important tool in preventing ineligible families from enrolling in BadgerCare. However, it did create a significant barrier for eligible families, who either did not realize the new requirement was in place, or were embarrassed to bring the forms to employers who had little incentive to complete them. The state subsequently returned to a system where it took responsibility for verifying an applicant's status.
Doyle heard about innovations in Medicaid in other states when visiting a National
Governor's Association meeting, and turned his attention to using Medicaid to broaden health care access in the state. He set a goal of 98 percent of citizens having access to health coverage. According to one advocate for low-income families the Doyle administration "was genuinely committed to coverage for kids and he gave them [state employees] the green light. And then they felt they had a license to remove all the barriers they could." This included administrative barriers. Even with the reductions in administrative burden under Thompson, a survey prior to the implementation of BadgerCare Plus found that burdens did discourage participation: 34 percent said they found it too hard to get paperwork; 19 percent said that the application process was too hard, while 24 percent pointed to difficulties in applying in person (Gavin et al. 2003) .
Doyle expanded the pattern of outreach pursued under Thompson. DHS administrators believed that the all-kids frame allowed for broad-based marketing that made it less likely that eligible parents would be confused about their status: "the 'All Kids' message is very helpful for marketing even for people who are otherwise eligible for the program. I think that was one of the things that we hoped and talked about is that we wanted to end the stigma" (Hynes and Oliver 2010) . In addition to bilingual and culturally-specific marketing materials, the state engaged in partnerships with community organizations, providing mini-grants to train them to provide program information and application assistance ).
The Doyle administration also undertook new initiatives to reduce burdens. For example, it pursued a one-time auto-enrollment of individuals that state data suggested were eligible.
Auto-enrollment is the most dramatic way to reduce burden for applicants. Applicants do not have to overcome psychological costs to opt-in, do not have to learn about the program, and face no compliance burden. Some of these costs arise if the individual chooses to stay in the program, but the barriers to entering the program were significantly reduced. A study using state administrative data shows that auto-enrollment captured a very large number of previously nonenrolled eligible individuals ).
The DHS also sought to ease learning and application compliance costs through online tools, primarily via a new website named ACCESS. The website included information about SNAP, Medicaid, and BadgerCare in English and Spanish. An innovative aspect of ACCESS is that it allowed potential applicants to do a preliminary check of their eligibility. Internal DHS staff guidance noted this was needed because: "Many potentially eligible people have misperceptions about the eligibility requirements…They may choose not to apply because of incorrect assumptions about their potential level of benefits…Many people believe the application process would involve too much time and effort unless they feel reasonably confident that they will be eligible for benefits." Later versions of ACCESS allowed individuals to check their benefits and program requirements. This supplemented, but did not replace, notices and other communication with caseworkers. Eventually ACESS allowed individuals to fill out applications online, and by 2010 was the most popular method of applying for benefits (Leininger et al. 2011 ).
The Doyle administration was largely able to buffer directives from the federal government that would have increased burdens. In 2005, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act, Congress required that applicants for Medicaid had to provide documentation of citizenship.
Prior to this point, self-declaration of citizenship status was deemed sufficient unless the claim was questionable, in which case eligibility workers could require documentation. The response of the Doyle administration reflected the evolution in its understanding of burden since its early experience with employer insurance verification requirements. The DHS developed a series of policy guidelines that gave applicants flexibility in providing information, encouraged program workers to provide help, and minimized the possibility that eligible recipients would lose coverage. If it was possible to collect the information from other sources, state workers were told to do so.
The DHS needed a federal waiver to expand BadgerCare to BadgerCare Plus by combining funds from Medicaid and CHIP. Winning this waiver required negotiating with a Bush administration that had become increasingly concerned about the growing size of CHIP and Medicaid, and resistant to waiver requests that would expand these programs. The federal government pressured state governments to reduce take-up error rates in Medicaid -and consequently increase administrative burden (Thompson 2012) . In an August 17 2007 letter, the administration also told states that they had to demonstrate a 95 percent take-up rate for eligible CHIP beneficiaries before they could expand it to citizens above 250 percent of FPL. This target was so unrealistic that its effect was to discourage efforts to expand CHIP. Wisconsin that aligned well with strategies Wisconsin was already pursuing. 5 To qualify for bonuses, states had to increase enrollment via active outreach programs, and implement features explicitly designed to reduce learning and compliance costs: extending the eligibility of children to 12 months before a renewal process; liberalizing asset requirements; combining Medicaid and CHIP application forms; eliminating in-person interviews; providing presumptive eligibility for children; and utilizing auto or administrative enrollment. Other incentives sought to further reduce burdens to encourage take-up. As before, unused CHIP funds would be returned to the federal government, but now states would see permanent decreases in their funding for failure to spend their allotted amount. One hundred million dollars was allocated to outreach, with the vast majority given to state and local governments and community organizations. While citizenship verification requirements remained, the Reauthorization Act allowed states to create a data exchange with Social Security, which in turn reduced the need for states to seek verification from applicants. Error-reporting requirements passed under Bush were restructured to avoid discouraging efforts to increase take-up (Thompson 2012) . Sibelius, which gave states a good deal more discretion in deciding eligibility levels than allowed for the in the Affordable Care Act. Governor Walker rejected new federal funding from the Affordable Care Act, dramatically reducing Medicaid access to citizens above the federal poverty level.
The concern with fraud had an ironic effect in reducing administrative burden for some groups. Effective May 2011, DHS allowed administrative renewal for select low-risk BadgerCare Plus, SNAP, and Medicaid cases. According to a DHS operations memo "the primary purpose of the administrative renewal project is to increase program integrity by focusing eligibility workers on higher-risk renewals." For administrative renewals, department staff now identify cases that are highly unlikely to lose eligibility and allow them to renew based on state data. An administrative renewal case will not get an eligibility renewal notice from the agency, and the household is not required to provide any additional information in order to continue their eligibility.
Conclusion: A Research Agenda for Administrative Burden
If we are to take the concept of administrative burden seriously, what does it imply for scholarship? In this section, we draw from both the Wisconsin case and our review of prior work to sketch a research agenda. Some of these questions are being addressed, but not resolved, and almost entirely within the field of social policy. Others are relatively neglected: the political origins of burdens, bureaucratic relationships with burdens, the role of third parties, and normative questions about the role of the state in monitoring and managing levels of burdens.
How are burdens used as policy instruments?
We argue that administrative burden offers another venue in which to study the ongoing interplay between politics and administration. In the (Moynihan, Herd, and Rigby 2013) .
The relationship between politics and burdens becomes even more apparent when these burdens are directly legislated. For example, in the area of election administration, there has been a clear partisan divide in the willingness of legislators to impose new voter identification requirements (Hale and McNeal 2010) .
We also propose a secondary question, which is whether these instruments are attractive precisely because they can be implemented via less visible administrative processes, requiring lower political consultation and less need to acknowledge their purpose. A related question is under what conditions do "hidden politics" become visible, subject to explicit political debate.
The voter identification issue is one such example, as is the growing willingness of Congress to specify in legislation how states design Medicaid and CHIP procedures (e.g., requirements of evidence of citizenship, or incentives to expand access in the CHIP Reauthorization Act). The answer likely has to do with growing awareness in a policy area that such burdens are consequential, and the role of stakeholders in arguing for or against them.
What are the effects of burdens on citizens?
There is little doubt that, within the area of social policy at least, administrative burdens have material impacts on whether individuals receive public services. Policy feedback research further suggests that the experience of burdensome processes undermines political efficacy and civic participation. There is therefore a strong theoretical and empirical basis to understand how the experience of policy implementation matters to citizens in these and other ways, and in a wider variety of policy areas than has been studied thus far.
How do administrative burdens affect inequality?
Another relevant question is whether the targeting of administrative burdens, and the ability to overcome those burdens, vary across different subgroups of the population. Burdens may be more likely to be imposed on politically powerless or unpopular groups, and may have the most dramatic effects on those with lower financial resources and human capital assets. Indeed, there is evidence that burden differentially impacts by class, race, and gender in social programs (Aizer 2003; Brodkin and Mamjundar 2010; Heckman and Smith 2003) , education (Hoxby and Avery 2012) , voting registration rules (Rigby and Springer 2011) , and immigration (Fix, Passel and Sucher 2003) .
The stresses of poverty may also exacerbate the cognitive biases that amplify the effects of burdens. Mullainthan and Shafir (2013, 282) point to evidence from behavioral economics that suggests that individuals "are less likely to weigh long-term consequences and exhibit forward-looking behaviors when we are threatened, challenged, and depleted." This implies that those who may need services the most -individuals with lower income, education, and language skills -are most negatively affected by burdens. In sum, burden can exacerbate inequality.
What is the relationship between administrators and burden?
Administrators play an active role in creating and enforcing burdens, and street level bureaucrats may use their discretion rigidly enforce, expand upon, or ameliorate the effects of burdens (Brodkin and Lipsky 1983; Lipsky 1984) . In the Wisconsin case the specialized knowledge of administrative processes gave bureaucrats a central role in designing initiatives to alter burdens, but generally suggests that this knowledge was used in ways consistent with changing political preferences.
Just as administrators shape burdens, so too may burdens matter to how administrators define their organizational role. For example, if administrators who are motivated to help others believe their work causes them to impose unfair burdens, their organizational commitment and effort may decline.
What is the role of third parties in administrative burdens? As services are increasingly provided in a state of agents (Heinrich, Lynn and Milward 2010) , what role do those third parties play in facilitating or easing burdens? Less constrained by rules than bureaucratic counterparts, these agents may pursue their beliefs and incentives in ways that matter to burden. For example, advocacy and community groups in the Wisconsin case pursued outreach partly because extending benefits to the poor or their members fit with their mission, while hospitals became adept at using reductions in burden to enroll patients because it helped to reduce the financial costs of providing charitable care. Agents may also use burdens to engage in the 'creamskimming' of more profitable clients, by placing more barriers in the path of less attractive clients (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011 ).
An even clearer example of the role of incentives for third parties comes from the tax preparation industry. Private tax-preparers have been instrumental in facilitating access to the EITC. They have marketed the program to clients, built new offices in low-income neighborhoods, and partnered in outreach campaigns to educate individuals about their eligibility (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007) . But the same industry has actively opposed proposals for automated tax-returns that would eliminate the need for most citizens to prepare taxes. The motivation of the industry is not based on any overriding conviction about the burdens citizens should face in the tax system, but instead reflects simple profit incentives. Reducing burdens to the EITC expanded the pool of customers and the possibility of selling these customers prerefund loans. On the other hand, automated tax returns threaten the basic business model of the tax-preparation industry. This example also illustrates another role that agents may play, which is as a political stakeholder, willing to lobby for or against changes in administrative burden made by policymakers.
What responsibility does government hold in monitoring and regulating administrative
burdens? With the evolution of governance towards a state of agents, the state has struggled to articulate its purpose. The concept of administrative burden offers a logical role for the state to occupy that fits with the current emphasis on third-party governance, while drawing on a mixture
of older values such due process, equity, procedural fairness, and customer service. The state should monitor and regulate how citizens experience burden in their interactions with public services, even if private actors provide those services. Service providers should face explicit expectations about how they impose burdens in the same way they are accountable to fiscal and performance expectations. This would balance the current emphasis on performance measures, limiting discretionary activities that perversely improve measured performance by imposing burdens on citizens (e.g., Soss, Fording and Schram 2011) . Empirical studies could compare differences between policy areas or government entities where burden is more or less regulated.
How can burdens be reduced? Both behavioral economics and social psychology imply that individual experiences of burden will inevitably be somewhat subjective. The state may also have a limited influence on many factors that influence how an individual responds to burden, e.g., human capital, or popular beliefs about programs. But there are also systematic aspects of burden that can be addressed. This raises the practical question of how to reduce burden, and when such efforts are appropriate. Scholarship can help inform these choices. The literature reviewed in this article, and the Wisconsin case, provides evidence on practices to reduce burden.
Policymakers can reduce learning and compliance costs, and structure interactions in ways that minimize psychological costs and positively interact with cognitive biases. Research may also help guide where expenditures on reducing burdens may be most effective. For example, Kincheloe, Frates and Brown (2006) find that outreach spending on media campaigns for Medicaid are less beneficial than on outreach spending on enrollment assistants and community groups. If public administration scholarship adopts administrative burden as a topic of study, perhaps the greatest contribution it may offer is in uncovering mechanisms to minimize burdens, or to shift them to the state.
In some cases, burdens may add little in terms of legitimate purposes, and there is little reason not to remove them. But burdens may also be imposed to reflect legitimate political values, and their reduction raises questions about the relative balance between minimizing burdens and the purpose of those burdens. In the area of social policy, the debate has historically focused on the danger of waste, fraud and abuse, with less consideration of the effect of burdens on take-up (Brodkin and Lipsky 1987) . Empirical research can help to inform these types of tradeoffs with analyses of the degree to which reductions in burdens actually undermine other values, or the degree to which new burdens undercut access to programs.
A particularly promising avenue of research is to investigate practices and program designs that reduce burden without undercutting other values. For example, Social Security is a program with strict administrative rules and documentation requirements, but almost all administrative burden falls on the state rather than the citizen. This is because the state takes responsibility for collecting earnings data, meaning that applicants do not need to provide the lifetime of detailed income documentation that helps the program achieve a near zero error rate.
Information technology and governmental data systems make it more feasible for states to shift burdens from the citizen to the state . Online systems can reduce learning costs and allow for online applications. By investing in data systems that can integrate data across programs, the state can reduce the need for applicants to provide the same data multiple times, while improving accuracy. For example, information based on state tax returns is more likely to be accurate than self-reported income data in verifying eligibility. A step further would be autoenrollment, which effectively uses state data to alter the default choice for individuals on whether they participate in a program or not (Dorn, Hall and Hogan 2009 ). The analysis of such options provides a clear way for public administration scholars to make theoretically-based, empirically-grounded contributions to the practice of governance. 
